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SUMMARY
The article analyses certain aspects of the exceptional migration process unfolding in 
Europe from the middle of September to the beginning of November, 2015. It focuses 
on analysis of managing that migration in Croatia through the presentation of the 
functioning of the reception (and transit) centre at Opatovac. A qualitative ethno-
graphic and anthropological research approach has been applied. The ethnographic 
perspective offers a complex view of responses to the events, pointing out the para-
doxes in refugee reception and transit migration management in Croatia. It is estab-
lished that there are constant contradictions contained in the nexus of security and 
humanitarian demands in the migration process management, these largely coming 
to the fore because of a lack of international co-operation and a firm stance and com-
mon policy on the part of the EU. In that way, the EU has contributed to the deepen-
ing of the humanitarian migration crisis, but also demonstrated its deep value crisis.
KEY WORDS: refugees, migrants, security, humaneness, Croatia, EU
INTRODUCTION
Forced out by the civil wars throughout the Middle East, hundreds of 
thousands of refugees and migrants were fleeing their homes and head-
ing toward Western Europe during 2015. On their route, they had to cross 
Turkey and the Agean Sea to reach the Greek islands, a first entry point into 
the European Union. The route continued by ferry to mainland Greece, and 
then through Macedonia (to a lesser extent Bulgaria) and Serbia. Until the 
late summer of 2015 it went through Hungary. Confronted with more than 
350,000 migrants who moved through its territory in the summer of 2015 on 
their way to Austria, Hungary erected a wire fence and eventually sealed off 
its border, first with Serbia (mid-September) and then with Croatia (mid-
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October). Since mid-September, Croatia has become the main corridor for 
the passage towards Hungary and Slovenia and to final destinations in 
Austria and Germany. Between mid-September and the end of November, 
some 460,000 migrants were transported through Croatia towards Hungary 
and Slovenia. At times, more than 10,000 persons crossed the Croatian bor-
der with Serbia and were transported to the West on a daily basis. That 
unprecedented level of arrivals was a consequence of the de facto suspension 
of the Dublin Regulation1 and the German Prime Minister announcing that 
Germany would receive the Syrians. This decision was explained in terms 
of (controversial) labour demand of German industry.2 It is no doubt that 
moral and humane considerations also played a role, because it followed 
humanitarian disasters such as the discovery of a truck with 71 suffocated 
migrants in Austria in late August. Good summer and autumn weather was 
certainly also contributing to the continuous migration flow from war-torn 
areas in the Middle East.
The exodus toward EU and, in particular, toward Germany, occurred 
against a backdrop of the confident statement by the German Prime Minis-
ter on August 30, 2015 that Germany would manage the reception of refu-
gees and overcome whatever came in its way while doing so.3 However, 
the Prime Minister’s confidence has been challenged many times over the 
months that followed, mainly because most EU states have shown no soli-
darity in sharing the growing number of migrants and establishing a joint 
action plan to deal with the unprecedented number of arrivals. Months of 
mutual accusations made by the states included in the transit and reception 
of refugees followed, with dissonant voices preventing an agreement on a 
common European policy and sharing of refugees.
1 EU asylum legislation requires migrants to apply for asylum in the first EU country in 
which they arrive. Greece has been exempt from this regulation since 2011 due to its 
dysfunctional asylum system; hence Hungary became the first entry point to the EU on 
this route. Hungary tried to apply the legislation, but gave up under the pressure of the 
numbers (Kallius, Monterescu and Rajaram, 2016).





deutscher-arbeitsmarkt-braucht-500-000-zuwanderer-pro-jahr (3 November 2015).
3 In full: “Wir haben so vieles geschafft, wir schaffen das. Wir schaffen das, und wo uns 
etwas im Wege steht, muss es überwunden werden” or: “We have managed so much, 
we will manage it. We will manage it, and if something comes in our way, it must be 
overcome”, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/angela-merkels-sommerpressekonfer-
enz-13778484.html (31 August 2015).
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Speaking at the Migration Crisis and the Future of the European Project fo-
rum at the European Parliamentary Office of Information in Zagreb on Oc-
tober 9, 2015 one of the speakers, a European MP, Tonino Picula, said that 
the impossibility of solving the migration crisis was an indicator of the EU 
political crisis. The migration crisis, according to Picula, is the trigger to 
the key questions on the future organisation of the EU and the relations 
between the Member States, in fact, to the very sense of the EU’s existence 
and profile that it will build in the future.4 Will the EU continue to build 
on the community, solidarity and co-operation that gave rise to the Euro-
pean project after World War II? Or will the centrifugal forces of particular 
national politics increasingly divide the already weak European political 
arena, on the background of unequal economic and social realities? Due to 
the absence of a common migration policy and response to the 2015 refugee 
“crisis”, 5 one cannot help feeling that the latter scenario has better prospects 
of becoming reality.
The article shows that the attempt at control and finding a solution with-
in one nation-state is futile in a situation of lack of solidarity and co-opera-
tion between nation-states directly or indirectly implicated in the migration 
flow. It argues that, despite Germany’s driving force and determination to 
come to grips with the large number of refugees, the opposing national re-
sponses to the refugee flow have worsened the humanitarian deficit inher-
ent in all refugee migration and deepened the entire “crisis”. This is shown 
by analysis of migration flow management in Croatia during September 
and October, 2015. Relying on ethnographic field research and encounters 
with various actors in the events as the source of interpretation, the article 
points out complexities in managing this migration in the Croatian and Eu-
ropean context.
A TERMINOLOGICAL NOTE: MIGRANT OR REFUGEE
This contribution does not have the intention of differentiating and theo-
retically analysing the terms migrant and refugee. However, due to the dif-
ferences of opinion on the appropriate term, I shall briefly refer to them. Ac-
tors in this mixed migration flow encompass various categories of voluntary 
and involuntary (forced) migrants. The generic term “migrant” includes 
4 See: http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/399838/Izbjeglice-okidac-za-raspravu-o-EU-
za-deset-godina.html (3 November 2015).
5 The term “crisis” is a euphemism that inadequately describes the scale and dehumanis-
ing effects of the current mass immigration into Europe.
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every person who moves to another country with the intention of staying 
there for a certain time. 6 Therefore, in describing the phenomenon I speak 
of migrants or the migration flow/process. We usually consider economic 
migrants to be voluntary migrants, while we call involuntary migrants refu-
gees. The departure of refugees is imposed and usually the consequence 
of external force or violence (cf. Heršak, 1998: 90). The reasons for which 
they decide to migrate vary, but are usually connected with wartime peril, 
persecution because of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, mem-
bership in a particular social group, the lack of respect for human rights, 
and the like (cf. the Convention on Refugee Status of 19517). More recently, 
forced migration is also connected with natural disasters. It is rarely pos-
sible to differentiate the motives for migration, so that the border between 
the two main categories – voluntary and involuntary migrants – is difficult 
to draw. That has occurred in the case of migration flows in 2015, too, with 
Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans being joined by Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and 
Kosovari, among others. However, since most of the persons in this case 
come from devastated war zones, marked by political and economic insta-
bility, I shall call them refugees (cf. the Institute for Migration and Ethnic 
Studies, 2015).
THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE REFUGEE 
PHENOMENON
I travelled to the area directly exposed to the arrival of refugees in east-
ern Croatia (the villages of Tovarnik and Opatovac) prompted by human 
motives and scholarly interest, since the refugee theme is one of the fields 
of my research, particularly connected with forced migration during and 
after the disintegration of Yugoslavia (e.g. Čapo Žmegač, 2005, 2007; Čapo, 
2014). Apart from that, I wanted to witness at close hand the events that had 
been deploying before our eyes for months. Their dimensions and intensity 
over a brief period as well as certain characteristics (the heterogenic origins 
of the refugees, the diversification of the migration motives, the share of 
unaccompanied minors etc.) (cf. OECD, 2015) have not been seen in the 
European space in the last sixty years or so.8 
6 The term “migrant” is encumbered with connotations on origin and socio-economic sta-
tus: e.g. businessmen and employees of trans-national companies coming from the US 
or Western Europe is never referred to as migrants, but as “expatriates” or “mobile indi-
viduals”. 
7 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UNTS, 189 (2545), 28. 07. 1951.
8 Comparisons according to criteria of forced migration or mass character could be drawn 
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Departure to the location of events is a classical method in cultural and 
social anthropology, a nomadic discipline that bases its insights, analyses 
and interpretations on direct experience and encounters with the events’ 
participants. In going there I wanted, first of all, to study the reactions of 
the local population to the refugee situation and establish if they were in-
clined to perceive the refugees as an economic, social and cultural threat 
as mentioned in quantitatively (Čačić-Kumpes, Gregurović and Kumpes, 
2012; Župarić-Iljić and Gregurović, 2013; see Župarić-Iljić 2013 for a review 
of those studies), but also qualitatively (ethnographically) based studies 
(Pozniak and Petrović, 2014). I have dealt with that aspect of the issue in 
another article (Čapo, 2015). 
I believed that personal contact with the refugees themselves and inquiry 
into their motives, stories and aspirations was not an option at this stage. 
On the one hand, the question was if one could – and how – “study” the 
refugees at this moment of their transit through Croatia. On the other, I was 
not inclined to transform my research into “epistemic violence” towards the 
refugees (De Genova according to Andersson, 2014: 12), by submitting het-
erogenous voices and human destinies to a reducing ethnographic gaze. As 
was shown during my six-day stay in the field, conversations with the refu-
gees could not, in any case, be conducted. Because of their large number, 
the short duration of their stay at the Opatovac reception centre, the police 
control that surrounded them, the impossibility of my moving freely and 
for any length of time at the reception centre, my encounters with the refu-
gees were brief and informative, journalistic, and not of the ethnographic-
research type.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs issued me a permit for entry and brief 
stays at the reception centre over several days. A direct insight into what 
was happening in and around the reception centre led me to an analysis of 
the system of refugee reception in Croatia – its configuration, functioning 
and the harrowing consequences that it had for the refugees during my stay 
on the spot, from October 18 to 23, 2015.
The interpretation herein is based on media information, official noti-
fications by the Ministry of Internal Affairs9 and on what I saw and learnt 
with the migration of the ethnic German population from the eastern parts of Europe 
towards Germany after World War II, or of migration in the aftermath of decolonisation; 
for example, the exodus of the French from Algiers in the 1960s, and the like (cf. OECD, 
2015). 
9 Since September 16, 2015 The Ministry of Internal Affairs has been posting on its official 
pages notifications on the Reception and Accommodation of Migrants in the Republic 
of Croatia, in Croatian and English (see: http://www.mup.hr/219671.aspx; http://www.
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through conversations with various actors within and outside the reception 
centre: members of the local population not directly engaged in refugee re-
ception, the mayors of the Lovas (of which Opatovac is a part) and Tovarnik 
municipalities, local volunteers and people officially engaged in refugee 
reception, translators, doctors, bus drivers who transported the refugees, 
police officers and refugees themselves. 
Spending time in the field cannot encompass its entirety and that is why 
post-modern ethnography is fragmentary (Tyler, 1986). Such is also my at-
tempt to integrate my partial and fragmentary experience of a complex situ-
ation into anthropological theories of society, state, space and border. The 
ambiguity and subjectivity of the researcher (along with the added ambigu-
ity and subjectivity of the reader) are unavoidable; the text will thus proba-
bly be interpreted in different ways and misinterpreted, since “the meaning 
of the text is the sum of its misreadings”, said Stephen Tyler already thirty 
years ago (1986: 135).
THE HISTORY OF EVENTS IN CROATIA
From September 15, 2015, after Hungary had completed its installation 
of a razor-wire fence towards Serbia and made impossible the further pas-
sage of refugees from that country towards Austria and Germany, the refu-
gees in Serbia were re-routed towards the Croatian border. In the border 
municipality of Tovarnik, the police, the State Administration for Protec-
tion and Rescue, and the Croatian Red Cross were prepared for reception 
of refugees in the courtyard of the police station. It was anticipated that up 
to 500 refugees would arrive per day. However, on the very first day, Sep-
tember 15 and overnight leading to September 17, 5,650 refugees entered 
Croatia with some 11,000 persons to the end of that second day.10 A month 
later, a female inhabitant of Tovarnik described her utter amazement with 
the huge number of refugees who had arrived in only two days in her small 
village of some 1,500 people:
I had never seen such a huge number of people… they were sleeping along the 
road, in the canals, and there were thousands of them. You can’t cross the street 
towards the railway station, there’s no chance of crossing it. Only the Red Cross 
vehicle could pass through. 
mup.hr/main.aspx?id=219696 ). On October 21, 2015, it also posted the document “Migra-
tion Crisis in Croatia: Overview”, http://www.mup.hr/219671.aspx (16 February 2016). 
The media sources are cited according to the summary of HINA’s (Croatian information 
agency) news items from September 16 to November 3, 2015, prepared with the kind help 
of Ivo Lučić.
10 http://www.mup.hr/main.aspx?id=220928 (2 February 2016).
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It would seem that the state was not prepared for the number of peo-
ple who would come. The media reports that were arriving almost hour 
by hour rectified previous reports and gave various contradictory pieces of 
information. In expectation of a small number of people, it was planned to 
register them in the existing centres for asylum-seekers and other places in 
which such centres could readily be set up due to the existing infrastructure, 
so the refugees were sent towards them at first (to Zagreb, Sisak, Osijek, and 
Beli Manastir).11 However, it soon became clear that the number of refugees 
exceeded Croatian reception capacities, so that the Minister for Internal Af-
fairs was named on September 17 as the head of the Government’s “Head-
quarters for Coordination of Activities Related to the Arrival of Migrants in 
the Republic of Croatia” and he announced the possibility of shutting down 
the border.12 At the same time, completely contradictory news items alter-
nated: that building of the tent settlement near Vinkovci had been halted,13 
the announcement of building one near Osijek14 that the Varaždin garrison 
was being prepared to accommodate refugees15 and the like.
The newspapers abounded in criticism of the government and the or-
ganisation of refugee reception. The assessments by local and county au-
thorities were of “a humanitarian catastrophe”, “a siege” and “a chaotic 
situation”, “the non-existence of government planning” and the like.16 The 
above-quoted Tovarnik inhabitant described the first days of refugee recep-
tion in Tovarnik, in which she herself volunteered, as 
a terrible, indescribable experience, an emergency situation, general chaos, no-
one had been expecting such an opera (…) not even in their wildest dreams…
The Prime Minister made a statement in which he said that the refu-
gees would not be stopping in Croatia: “they will pass and transit through 
Croatia”, a land of “small possibilities” but with “a big heart”.17 At the same 
time he rejected the possibility that Croatia would be forced to give more 
permanent shelter to refugees. On the third day following the first arrival 
of the refugees in Croatia, he repeated that Croatia did not want to be a hot 
spot for Europe and that 
we will not prevent those people from entering, but also not from leaving, beca-
11 http://www.mup.hr/main.aspx?id=220928 (16 February 2016).
12 Source: HINA, Sept. 17, 2015. NEWS-H9176986:1 
13 Source: HINA, Sept. 17, 2015. NEWS-H9176851:1 
14 Source: HINA, Sept. 17, 2015. NEWS-H9176851:1; NEWS-H9176913:1 
15 Source: HINA, Sept. 18, 2015. NEWS-H9187114:1 
16 Source: HINA, Sept. 17, 2015. NEWS-H9176855:1; NEWS-H9176944:1 
17 Source: HINA, Sept. 17, 2015. NEWS-H9176964:1 
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use it is otherwise clear that none of them wants to stay in Croatia, but we will 
not allow them to travel alone along the roads.18
Those statements indicate the strategy selected by the government: per-
mit the entry of refugees, organise their transit towards other European 
countries and control their movements through Croatia. Its strategy coin-
cided with the demands of the refugees that they be permitted to go to 
their desired destinations, mostly in Germany. For that purpose, the recep-
tion centre was set up in the disused crude oil warehouse in Opatovac in 
the Lovas municipality, some fifteen kilometres from the unofficial border 
crossing with Serbia near Bapska. The reception centre with a capacity for 
around 3,500 persons was opened on September 21, five days after the refu-
gees started to arrive in Croatia. Though officially named “reception cen-
tre”, the establishment actually functioned as a transit centre for refugees. 
The following procedure was to become stabilised through the next 
month: entry was largely by way of the illegal crossing near Bapska and to a 
lesser degree near Tovarnik, the so-called green belt, but not through the of-
ficial crossing. From the border, refugees were transported to the reception 
centre in Opatovac where they were registered and given basic humanitar-
ian aid before continuing on their way towards Hungary. At the beginning 
of November, when this article was completed, the number of refugees who 
had passed through Croatia since mid-September had reached 300,000.19 
For a month, right up until October 17, Hungary enabled unhindered 
entry of refugees from Croatia by train through Botovo (an illegal border 
crossing) or by bus through Baranjsko Petrovo Selo. Despite constant inter-
state tension between Croatia and Hungary, transit continued without in-
cident. However, after the completion of the barbed-wire barrier towards 
Croatia, Hungary blocked further transit, and a new refugee route was es-
tablished towards Slovenia. The rate of flow was reduced during the first 
few days from complete closing of entry to Hungary. At the same time, the 
pressure of refugees on the Croatian-Serbian border increased and excess 
situations occurred on both sides of the border as well as on the Slovenian-
Croatian border.
Because of the increasingly unfavourable weather conditions, the 
Croatian government decided to build a new reception centre in Slavonski 
Brod, around one hundred kilometres from the state border with Serbia. Af-
ter a two-week preparation period, the first trains from Tovarnik and from 
18 Source: HINA, Sept. 18, 2015. NEWS-H9187097:1
19 http://www.mup.hr/main.aspx?id=225848 (16 February 2016).
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Šid (in Serbia) arrived on November 3, and soon after that the reception 
centre at Opatovac was closed. 
FACILITATING TRANSIT AND SUSPENSION OF BORDER 
CONTROLS 
Confronted with tenfold higher numbers than those that had been an-
ticipated and for which it had been prepared, the Croatian government de-
cided on a specific form of migration flow management – facilitating transit 
through Croatia. Managing migration implies control over the entry of peo-
ple into the country and the application of migration policy.20 However, un-
der the exceptional circumstances of mass migration flows on a daily basis, 
migration policy as a whole and in the asylum area was suspended, while 
management had been reduced to helping people in exodus. In this process, 
there occurred violations of the border regime and state sovereignty.
The extraordinary collective force resulting from the mass nature and 
persistence of the refugees along with the collective psychosis of sorts that 
ruled among them because of the possibility of closing the EU border, the 
arrival of autumn and unfavourable weather conditions, and the dangers 
overcome on the previously completed journey, explain why the refugees 
could not be stopped by police cordons, border lines drawn between neigh-
bouring countries, wire fences, bad weather, or by the lack of co-operation 
between the neighbouring countries on the transit route. Refugees seek so-
lutions themselves when they believe that an obstacle has arisen in transit, 
when they crowd around at the border crossing or at the railway station, 
while the conditions under which they wait to be relocated are inadequate. 
In fact, refugees cannot bear waiting, and as one interview partner said, 
“they respect only force”. They demand to be let through and treated with 
dignity on their journey; they take matters into their own hands and be-
come agents of their own destiny (cf. Liisa Malkki, 1996 according to Ka-
llius, Monterescu and Rajaram, 2016). I witnessed that when I met people 
who had broken through the police cordon on the border with Serbia on 
October 19 and then walked fifteen kilometres to the reception centre in 
Opatovac in cold and rainy weather. That was a vivid example of their resil-
ience, their unstoppable nature and the demand that the border be opened 
so that they could continue their journey towards their chosen destination. 
Chanting “open, open” at the state border was also a cry for dignified treat-
20 Croatia has migration policy for the 2013 – 2015 periods. Its sections also encompass the 
area of political asylum.
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ment and a sign of their conviction of the justification of their demands. For 
Croatia, as for other countries on the refugee route, there was no alternative 
but to enable them unhindered crossing of the state border.
A state border is a key element in national ideology and the narration 
about identity; it is an instrument of state policy and a symbol of sovereign-
ty (“the sacred border of state territory”) (De Genova, 2013: 1183), the legal, 
political and military dividing line between state territories (Donnan and 
Haller, 1999). Therefore, border control is a symbolic demonstration and 
visual staging of the state and its sovereignty (Donnan and Haller, 1999). 
However, in the face of the mass arrival of refugees, borders were shown to 
be “spectacularly inefficient” (cf. Andersson, 2015), while the “illegality” of 
the refugees was “spectacularly visible” (De Genova, 2013: 1181). 
The mass nature of the refugee movement removed the focus from the 
legal, political and even symbolic aspects of their de facto and de iure illegal 
crossing of the Croatian state border. Only in its first daily reports did the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs mention “illegal border crossing”21; subsequent-
ly, that qualification disappeared and only “entries” and “departures” were 
mentioned. It can be assumed that this occurred with an intention to avoid 
stressing that what was happening was de facto illegal crossing of the bor-
der. 
The border was also crossed illegally when entering the Schengen EU, 
that is, when crossing into Hungary and Slovenia. Until that time, the po-
rosity of state borders within the EU had functioned only inside the Schen-
gen area. It was the suspension of internal border control that reinforced the 
outer Schengen borders (since they defended the European zone of secu-
rity and freedom of movement). That conferred upon the EU the infamous 
title of “the European fortress” and led to the progressive “securitisation 
of migration”, i.e. strengthening of the security discourses and the tech-
nologies of supervision over refugees and asylum-seekers and/or migrants 
in general (Guild and Bigo, 2003; Bigo, 1998; Goldstein, 2010; Institute for 
Migration and Ethnic Studies, 2015). Several member states – Spain, Eng-
land, Bulgaria, and Hungary – also put up fences (partly or completely) in 
an attempt to halt the entry of immigrants. Analysing the African-Spanish 
border, Ruben Andersson claimed that, by reinforcing European borders, 
politicians were creating “a spectacular policy of fear” (Andersson, 2015), 
which was forcing migrants into the grey zone of smugglers and bandits on 
the one hand and, on the other, enabling entrepreneurs to develop a power-
ful industry in the field of security technology destined for border manage-
21 http://www.mup.hr/main.aspx?id=220928 (16 February 2016).
30_Capo.indd   396 3/28/2016   12:37:41 PM
397
Jasna Čapo: The Security-scape and the (In)Visibility of Refugees: Managing Refugee Flow through Croatia
ment and control. The author called it “the industry of illegality” and “a 
global business” whose major beneficiaries were the defence and security 
industries and smugglers (Andersson, 2014). 
Due to massive refugee migration of 2015, the surveillance of outer EU 
borders was suspended and people were allowed to enter practically with-
out any controls. The European fortress allowed free movement of people, 
by which it enabled a hitherto hindered aspect of globalisation. It is notewor-
thy in that respect that the German Prime Minister called the immigration 
process that we are witnessing “an aspect of globalisation”. If we define glo-
balisation (cf. Taylor, 2011) as the unfettered crossing of borders by people, 
goods and ideas, we will notice that the economic and cultural borders have 
long lost their meaning as an outcome of globalisation processes, while the 
political borders continue to be highly monitored, particularly if they are 
located on the dividing lines between economically unequal worlds and are 
approached by a certain type of mobile people – refugees and migrants mo-
tivated by poverty, conflicts or natural disasters or those who are seeking 
employment. It has proved impossible to implement harsh border control 
in a context of mass migration flows, under the political circumstances of 
the long-term war in Syria and the decisions by certain European states that 
they would accept refugees from Syria. Hence, this exceptional migration 
has realised the final key aspect of the globalisation process – movement of 
people – of those “undesirable migrants” – across what were until recently 
rigid EU borders. It occurred despite demands from certain member states 
for a halt to be called to this process of global mobility.
In Croatia, as elsewhere, the state border, that place of control and sym-
bol of national sovereignty, has been suspended in face of the mass nature 
of the refugee groups, while control and registration have been relocated 
inside national territory, in a reception centre located some fifteen kilome-
tres from the state border. 
THE SECURITY-SCAPE AND THE INVISIBILITY OF THE 
REFUGEES
The reception centre was managed by the Operations Centre of the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs headed up by the minister. The refugees were met 
at different spots at the border with Serbia and driven to the centre, where 
they were registered and assisted in various ways (refreshments and cloth-
ing were distributed, urgent medical care and, if necessary, psychological 
assistance were given, etc.). 
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On average, five to six thousand people arrived at the centre every day, 
and on some days at the end of October a record was set of over ten thou-
sand arrivals. The stay of the refugees at the centre lasted several hours, ten 
hours at the most. On exit, they were boarding the buses for transport to the 
destinations agreed upon between Croatia and the neighbouring countries 
(Hungary and Slovenia). A column of some twenty to thirty buses formed 
in front of the reception centre two to three times every day. While the col-
umn was being formed, the refugees were not allowed to leave the buses, 
wait outside or stroll around the village. The system of monitoring was de-
signed so that the refugees would be completely out of the way of the local 
population.
The reception centre functioned as an extra-territorial system: part of 
the village was excluded from the surrounding area and transformed into 
a border transit area, similar to those at international airports and maritime 
harbours. As in those places, it was here that arrivals and departures of 
refugees were registered and personal documents (if people had any) were 
checked. A part of the local territory temporarily became a transit zone, a 
non-place for the refugees (Augé, 1994) – an area used only instrumentally 
and temporarily. Because of its separation from the remainder of the village 
by iron fences and the impossibility to enter it, the locals colloquially called 
it “the camp”. 
There were only a few signs of the refugees’ presence outside the re-
ception centre itself and the entry area. The signs indicating exceptional 
circumstances were the cars of the workers at the centre and of visitors to 
the centre and of the media, parked at the foreseen parking area and on 
the nearby fields – and the booming business at the local bar. There was a 
traffic jam during periods of forming the bus columns on the roads in front 
of the reception centre for transfer of the refugees to further destinations, 
and the villagers who lived in the immediate vicinity complained. When 
the bus columns transporting the refugees were passing on the road, the 
villagers’ cars had to wait for up to fifteen minutes before they could leave 
their courtyards. Two things indicated that something was going on in the 
neighbouring village of Tovarnik and its surroundings: two UNHCR tents 
placed in front of the house in which that organisation had set up an office, 
and the traffic lights at the central intersection that were turned off, so that 
the buses carrying the refugees could pass through without stopping.22
22 That provoked joking comments among the locals about how they had switched off the 
traffic lights so that the buses carrying the refugees would not stop in their village. The 
reaction with humour was a typical way of the local inhabitants’ coping with the refu-
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Thus, the Opatovac reception centre would seem to have successfully 
implemented the government’s plan to facilitate the transit of refugees and 
monitor their movements. It can be seen from the statement given by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs that both undertakings were aimed at maintain-
ing the security of Croatian citizens and, something that was emphasised 
more rarely, the security of the refugees themselves because of the potential 
danger from land-mines in the fields of eastern Croatia (land-mines still 
being cleared after the war of the 1990s). The Minister of Internal Affairs 
stated on September 28 that the Republic of Croatia did not have on its ter-
ritory “even one refugee who was not under the monitoring of the police 
force”,23 while a few days earlier he had said that the security of Croatia’s 
citizens “had not fallen even an iota”.24 Those were messages directed to 
Croatian citizens, particularly the local inhabitants who, according to media 
news, had been alarmed during the first few days of disorganised reception 
of refugees.25 It was for that reason that the state construed and constructed 
the reception centre “security-scape” (cf. Lauth Bacas, 2014: 163) in which 
the refugees were displaced from the concrete locality and, most of the time, 
invisible to the local population. Efforts were made to keep them in that 
transit zone in order to minimise their encounters with the villagers and 
to avoid any possible threats that could stem from such encounters. Say-
ing that “life had returned to normal” since the reception centre had been 
opened and that “everything had become channelled, tidy and good”, the 
majority of the local inhabitants with whom I spoke confirmed that the state 
security plan had succeeded.
The Minister of Internal Affairs and the Prime Minister also stressed that 
humaneness was a motivating factor in their activities. The intention at the 
reception centre was to create “more humane conditions” for the refugees.26 
This gave grounds to the government to present Croatia as a “civilised 
country” that did not put up walls and wire fences but rather wanted to 
help the refugees, together with countries like Germany and Austria, and 
unlike countries like Hungary.27 Indeed, the centre operated smoothly and 
gee presence in their area (Čapo, 2015). It has been established that the inhabitants in 
the localities directly exposed to the refugee migration showed sympathy, empathy and 
solidarity with the refugees. This finding challenges both the wide-spread opinion about 
the xenophobia of Croatia’s citizens and the need for state security discourse and practice 
when dealing with refugees.
23 Source: HINA Sept. 28, 2016. NEWS-H9288655:1 
24 Source: HINA Sept. 23, 2016. NEWS-H9237967:1 
25 Source: HINA Sept. 17, 2016. NEWS-H9176855:1 
26 Source: HINA Sept. 20, 2016. NEWS-H9207408:1 
27 Source: HINA Spet. 22, 2016. NEWS-H9227682:1 
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showed a humane face. Non-governmental national and international or-
ganisations and governmental institutions were engaged 24 hours in car-
ing for and helping the refugees. The local inhabitants who worked at the 
centre were commenting on the humaneness of everybody engaged at the 
centre, including the police.
Let us take a look at how the aspiration towards the creation of more 
humane conditions at the reception centre had a reverse side.
SPECTACULAR VISIBILITY OF THE REFUGEES AND THE 
LIMITS OF HUMANENESS
Despite the efficient functioning of the reception centre as the transit 
area blocked off from contact with the locals, the refugee population was 
becoming visible from time to time and that in a disturbing way, both to the 
local population and to all the citizens of Croatia through the media. The 
situation would get out of control when certain transit parameters were 
being changed, concretely, at the moment when Hungary rejected further 
acceptance of refugees in mid-October, so that Croatia was obliged to re-
route them to Slovenia, which was not prepared to accept a large number 
of people.
The crisis command headquarters then decided to slow down transit 
through the Opatovac reception centre, although increasingly large groups 
of refugees were arriving at the border. This was done in a way that refu-
gees waiting on the border with Serbia were no longer allowed to cross the 
border at the customary rate and were kept there. According to the opin-
ions of several staff members at the reception centre, in that way “humane 
conditions were ensured” at the centre itself, the area of complete police 
supervision: the centre was not over-capacitated, thus ensuring its func-
tioning and cleaning, and maintenance of balance between the number of 
people arriving and leaving. The aspiration for humane treatment within 
the reception centre, paradoxically, had the undesirable consequence of 
dehumanisation outside of that fenced and supervised area. Outside the 
centre, in the border area and no-man’s-land, things got out of hand and 
the refugees burst through the police cordon and forced uncontrolled en-
try into Croatia. “Control with a human face” maintained through the es-
tablishment of the Opatovac reception centre showed itself to be flimsy. It 
showed its other face: lack of control, violence and repression on the border. 
There was a mêlée at the border: hundreds of refugees crossed the state bor-
der despite the police, making their way across the fields as in the first days 
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of entry into Croatia. They got lost on the way, walked across the fields and 
along the roads, the local road traffic was stopped or hindered, while the 
surrounding villages became a stage and backdrop to unpleasant scenes 
as the rain-drenched, freezing, muddy and barefoot men walked along the 
road in groups of some fifty people escorted by the police. Because they 
had broken through the police cordons in an uncontrolled manner, outside 
of the set framework, the police forced the men to walk from the border to 
the reception centre. The refugees became the object of “state-sanctioned 
violence” (Andersson, 2014) and were subjected to degrading inhumane 
treatment (cf. Lauth Bacas, 2014). 
A young Syrian from a group of men walking from the border to the re-
ception centre on October 19 approached the car that my driver had to stop 
to allow the group to pass. The young man introduced himself as a doctor 
and, obviously upset and bitter, hoping that we were journalists, told us in 
a mixture of English and German how degradingly they were being treated, 
having been forced to wait at the border crossing where there were no hu-
mane conditions, and being forced to walk after that. He definitely wanted 
that event to be transmitted by the media, hoping that what had happened 
to them would be condemned, and that Croatia would be obliged to treat 
the refugees more humanely. The next day, at the reception centre, another 
Syrian felt the need to speak out about his humiliation the previous day:
We were walking for eight hours, and the buses were behind us empty, they re-
fused to take us in the bus, we walked from Serbia to here, under the rain and we 
were freezing and no-one took us... They took the children and women, not us... 
We begged police for buses, buses were crossing beside us empty, and no-one 
took us... They are savage, I told a policeman on the road, I told them that God 
is watching us, is watching him. 
The border had become a “scene of spectacle” (De Genova, 2013: 1182). 
Even if it was not transformed into “a landscape of death” (Nevins, 2002 
according to De Genova, 2013), the refugees did suffer additional trauma 
to their already traumatic experience of being refugees on their way to the 
desired destinations: they lived through the separation of families, the dis-
appearance of family members, the cold, the feeling of humiliation. At the 
same time, the border as the “wild zone of power” (Buck-Morss, 2000 ac-
cording to De Genova, 2013) became a fertile terrain for sanctioning impa-
tient people.
Paradoxically then, the hyper-controlled system at the extra-territorial 
reception centre, which did show a humane face, generated the very op-
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posite on its most sensitive margins, the state border. I argue that this is 
the outcome of factors related to the security and humanitarian aspects of 
the monitoring system put in place on the one hand, and, on the other, 
to the absence of international coordination. The border is an interactive 
area, and unlike the reception centre that was fully under the control of the 
Croatian police, the border, paradoxically enough, was not: the events there 
depended on the co-operation between and the success of political nego-
tiations with neighbouring states – both those on the eastern border with 
Serbia and even more those on the western, Schengen border with Slovenia. 
The national framework for “solving the crisis” was completely ineffective 
when isolated from the inter- and trans-national context and co-operation. 
Because of the fissures in key inter-state agreements on transit, a particu-
larly traumatic and dehumanising situation arose for the refugees.
Refugees who had been invisible to that point suddenly became ex-
tremely visible in local everyday life at the very moment of the escalation 
of their suffering. That invoked the criticism of humanitarian organisations, 
but also of the local authorities, as events concealed from the public un-
til then flowed over in their most negative aspects into the public sphere. 
Although it had otherwise been fully excluded from helping the refugees, 
the local (district) administration then reacted promptly, calming the upset 
local people and calling on them to collect items needed by the frozen and 
bare-footed people at the reception centre. 
At the moment of the loss of control, another uncomfortable thing oc-
curred for the managers of the crisis: at just that “sad photogenic instance” 
(Feldman, 2014: 62), the refugees were the most interesting item for media 
presentation. Thus, on the basis of an exceptional situation and event, an 
unbalanced image of the management of refugee transit was created in the 
media, providing an excellent opportunity for unfounded criticism of the 
humaneness of the entire reception system.28 
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION – AN UNFINISHED STORY
This article has analysed a fragment of the exceptional and very dynamic 
migration situation in Croatia and the EU over the period from mid-Septem-
ber to the beginning of November, 2015 and more particularly in the second 
half of October. The focus has been on analysis of the functioning of the 
reception centre at Opatovac and on managing refugee transit in Croatia. In 
28 Media reporting of the refugee flow co-created the whole event and it would be worth-
while to analyse it separately.
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the period that I have described, the contradictions contained in the nexus 
of security and humanitarian demands in managing refugee transit were 
particularly prominent because of the lack of international agreements – or 
their being ignored – and of solidarity between the states involved.
The analysis has emphasised the complexity involved in managing the 
refugee situation. I have interpreted that complexity as a series of contradic-
tions and paradoxes in the Croatian state response to the arrival of a large 
number of refugees. Firstly, management of the migration flow suspended 
the border control on the Croatian border (also an outer border of the EU) 
and set it up in the transit area of the reception centre located some fifteen 
kilometres from the actual border. Secondly, the security technique of spa-
tial isolation (fencing in the refugees) with the purpose of controlling what 
the security discourse saw as a potentially dangerous element in the social 
fabric, only partly ensured their complete invisibility in the society. Thirdly, 
the aspiration for humane treatment of the refugees within the reception 
centre had the undesirable consequence of dehumanisation outside that 
area, at the state border. Following unsuccessful co-operation between the 
states on the refugee route, cracks appeared at that neuralgic point of the 
reception system and the refugees who had been largely invisible until then 
became spectacularly visible.
Those complexities in the Croatian management of the refugee flow 
should be understood in the light of the fundamental contradiction of the 
Croatian qua EU border regime. It is stretched between opposing tendencies 
of security and humanitarian issues: on the one hand, we have the repres-
sive application of the law and control (policing) of the national and also 
outer borders of the EU and, on the other, the ethical demands for humane-
ness and respect for universal human rights (Andersson, 2014, 2015). Other 
key variables for understanding the events are the mass nature and inten-
sity of the refugee flow, along with the incapability of EU member states – 
and the states on the migrant route – to arrive at consensus and agreement 
on common politics and measures.
Although it is impossible to deal with a trans-national process within 
isolated national frameworks that has constantly been occurring due to the 
impossibility of achieving inter-state co-operation. Therefore, it is fair to say 
that the EU has contributed to the deepening of the humanitarian migra-
tion crisis, while demonstrating its own profound political crisis. With the 
dearth of agreement and solidarity between EU member states, both the fu-
ture organisation and profile of the EU have been brought into question – as 
said by the Croatian European parliamentarian referred to at the beginning 
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of the article – along with the issue of the basic values of the EU: respect for 
human rights, humaneness, democracy and freedom of movement. 
At the moment of completing this article at the beginning of Novem-
ber 2015, the reception centre in Opatovac ceased operating: the entire in-
frastructure for reception and care of the refugees in transit was relocated 
to Slavonski Brod, the winter reception centre. As agreed between Serbia 
and Croatia, and Slovenia and Croatia, trains will travel directly from Šid 
in Serbia to Slavonski Brod and from there to Dobova in Slovenia, setting 
up a humanitarian corridor on the territories of three countries. That could 
mean that the dehumanising situation that I have described here will not be 
repeated. However, just exactly how the migration process and the accom-
panying humanitarian crisis will develop is very uncertain, and depends, it 
seems, largely on international factors, on coordination between the states 
on the migrant route, and co-operation at the level of the entire EU (cf. Insti-
tute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, 2015). Consequently, the most logical 
thing to do is to leave the conclusion to this story open.
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Sigurnosni krajolik i (ne)vidljivost izbjeglica: 
upravljanje izbjegličkim tokom kroz Hrvatsku
Jasna Čapo
SAŽETAK
Rad analizira neke aspekte iznimnoga migracijskog procesa što se odvijao u Europi 
od polovine rujna do početka studenoga 2015. Usredotočuje se na analizu uprav-
ljanja tom migracijom u Hrvatskoj kroz prikaz funkcioniranja prihvatnoga centra 
za izbjeglice u Opatovcu. Primjenjuju se kvalitativno etnografsko istraživanje i an-
tropološki pristup. Etnografska perspektiva nudi kompleksno viđenje odgovora na 
događaje, upućujući na paradokse u upravljanju migracijom u Hrvatskoj. Ustvrđuje 
se da je kontradiktornost sadržana u neksusu sigurnosnih i humanitarnih zahtjeva 
upravljanja migracijskim procesom stalno prisutna, a ponajviše dolazi do izražaja 
zbog međudržavne nesuradnje te jasnoga stava i zajedničke politike EU-a. Time je 
EU pridonio produbljivanju humanitarne migracijske krize, ali i izložio vlastitu du-
boku krizu vrijednosti. 
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